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VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES.
A LARGE number of cases, both in this-country and in England,
have come before the courts, in which it has been necessary to
decide whether or not a donor could revoke his gift. Many more
have arisen in which the conveyance had been beyond dispute perfected, and the question of intention bad to be decided, in 6rder to
determine whether the transaction was intended as a gift, or the
grantee's name used merely for the grantor's convenience, in which
case there would be a resulting trust in favor of the latter. It is
proposed in this article to state a few of the leading principles
governing this branch of law, and illustrate them by some of the
cases, reserving for a later article the question of how far, in modern times, an imperfect attempt to convey, by way of gift, will be
upheld in equity as a declaration of trust.
FIRST PROPOSTION.-A

court of chancery will not aid a volun-

teer in obtainingthe fruits of an imp.erfect conveyance orgift (except
where the gift or conveyance, though imperfect, may be sustained
as a declaration of trust), but will give effect to a Tpefect gO or
conveyance by declaring the grantee's or donee's rights, and by
eilforcing them where they are wrongftlN resisted.
Langdon v. Allen, 1 Weekly Notes (Pa.) 395 (1875). One
Abbott made a loan to his son and received from 'him two
notes for the amount, made by the son, but payable to the order
of two of the daughters of Abbott, sisters of the maker of the notes.
(1)
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After Abbott's (the father's) death, the notes were found, one overdue, in an old envelope, which was post-marked and addressed, in
an unknown handwriting, to the payee of the over-due note. The
envelope containing the notes was found in a paper box, with other
business papers of Abbott (the father), inside of a bureau-drawer or
closet, wYhich stood in the bed-room of the deceased, N-'bo dind
intestate, leaving several children, besides his two daughters, who
were respectively the payees of the above notes.
The question arose on a petition to the Orphans' Court, by the
administrators of Abbott (the fatier), up'on which the above facts
uppeared. The widow of Abbott (the son) testified that she was
present when the notes were made, and that the following conversation took place:Thomas P. Abbott (the son). "Who shall I make these notes
out to ?"
George Abbott (the father). "Well, I hadn't thought of any one
else but myself to have them made to."
T. F. A. "Suppose I make one out to Sarah and one to Fannie
(the respective payees of the notes), as there is an unjust claim
talked of coming against your property."
G. A. "Well, I don't care; it would be just as well."
There was other evidence by the same witness, to the same effect,
as to the contemporaneous intention of Abbott (the father). There
was, also, contradictory evidence of subsequent conversations, in
which Abbott expressed himself in regard to the notes in question.
It was not pretended that either of Abbott's daughters, the payees
of the notes, had ever seen or heard of the existence of the notes
prior to their father's death.
The rule was discharged, which had been granted upon the petition to stop proceedings upon the judgment, already obtained on the
first note, in an action by the payee against the makers' adiministrators. The administrators of Abbott (the father), the petitioners,
appealed from the decree discharging the rule.
The Supreme Court, without deciding whether an appeal lay,
held that primdfacie there was evidence of a gift from the relationship of the parties and form of the notes, and said that the court
could not say that that implication bad been overturned by the evidence, and a resulting trust established. The court also said, that
delivery of the instrument of title, the note, was unnecessar- to
perfect the donee's title. T'l CU IAii.--Judgment affirmed.
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Sidmouth v. sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447 (1840).

Lord Stowell had
1826, large sums
and
1825
during
times,
purchased, at six different
in the funds in the name of his only .on, Mr. Scott, who, on three
occasions during those years, execute&" three powers of attorney,
authorizing Lord Stowell and his bankers to receive the dividends,
which was done, and the amount carried to the credit of Lord
Stowell's account. Air. Scott did not know of the purchases
at the time they were made, and on two occasions he did not
know of the fact till the time when he executed the powers of attorney. When Lord Stowell came to his bankers on these occasions,
after mentioning that he had some money to lay out, he would say,
"What shall I buy? I have some idea of buying the stocks in my
son's name," and after hesitating and considering for a short time
he would add, "Well, I think I will buy it in my son's name," or
words to that effect. The witness, the banker's clerk, further testified that he was led to believe, as well from his conversations with
Lord Stowell as from the manner in which the -stock was dealt
with and treated, that Lord Stowell always considered that the
stock so purchased in his said son's name still remained his own property. Lord Stowell survived his son, and the question arose on a
bill filed by Mr. Scott's executrix, his sister and Lord Stowell's
daughter, against Lord Stowell's executors and next of kin.
The Master of the Rolls, Lord LANGDALE, said that the law
applicable to cases of this nature was subject to so little doubt that
it had not been questioned in the argument of this case. "Where
property is purchased by a parent in the name of his child, the purchase is primd facie to be deemed an advancement; the resulting
or implied trust which arises in favor of the person who pays the
purchase-money, and takes a conveyance or transfer in the name
of a stranger, does not arise in the case of a purchase by a parent
in the name. of a child; still * * * that evidence may be rebutted
by other evidence, manifesting an intention that the child shall take
as a trustee."
His lordship then held that the deliberation exercised by Lord
Stowell on the occasions of transfer afforded no evidence whatever
that he intended his son to be a trustee of the stock. Lord Stowell
probably intended, when the transfers were made, that the dividends should be received by himself. It could not, however, be
supposed from that fact that Lord Stowell intended his son to be a
mere trustee for him. He meant to continue to maintain his son,
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who was living in the same house with him. If he had meant only
a contingent provision, he would probably have made a transfer into
the joint names of himself and his son. If he had intended to retain
the absplute dominion in himself, notwithstanding the transfer, he
would probably have extended the power so as to sell and transfer.
.Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Yes. 656 a, 661 (1802). Nathaniel Ellison
conveyed certain property, .consisting of leases of collieries, &c., to
trustees, in trust for himself for life, and after his death during the
remainder of the terms of the leases owned by him, to be subject
to the payment of a yearly sum to Q, and subject thereto to the
payment of a yearly sum to Jane Ellison, his wife, and various provisions for his children. After the testator's death his Widow and
C. filed a bill, praying that the trusts above declared might be
established. One of the questions in the case was whether or
not the court would carry out a voluntary settlement. ELDO-N
L. C., said: "I take the distinction to be, that if you want the
assistance of the court to constitute you estui que trust, and the
instrument is voluntary, you shall not have that assistance for
the purpose of constituting you cestui que trust, as upon a covenant to transfer stock, &c. ; if it rests in covenant, and is purely
voluntary, this court will not execute that voluntary covenant; but
if the .party has completely transferred stock, &c., though it is voluntary, yet the legal conveyance being effectually made, the equitable interest will be enforced by this court. That distinction was
cleafly taken in Colrnan v. Sarrel, 1 Yes. 50, independent of the
vicious consideration. * * * But if the actual transfer is made, that
constitutes the relation between trustee and cestui que trust, though
voluntary, and without good or meritorious consideration; and it
is clear in that case, that if the stock had been actually transferred,
unless the trinsaction was affected by the turpitude of the consideration, the court would have executed it against the trustee and the
author of the trust."
"In this case, therefore, the person claiming under the settlement
might maintain a suit, notwithstanding any objection made to it as
being voluntary." * * *
" Upon the whole, therefore, this relief must be granted, though
I agree, that, if it rested in covenant, the personal representative
might have put them to their legal remedies."
Tierney v. Wood, 19 Beav. 330, 835 (1854). The settlor purchased a house which he had conveyed to the plaintiff in fee, who
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held it in trust for the settlor. At t~e same time the settlor transferred a sum of stock into the plaintiff's name, and by his directiont
the plaintiff afterwards sold .it out and delivered the proceeds of the
sale to the settlor. Some time after the purchase of the house the
settlor delivered to the plaintiff a writing signed by lil, ivhereby
he declared as follows: "I hereby desire that after my death, the
stock now in the Bank of England3 with the house and land now
-belonging to me, shall be held by you, as you at present hold it,
for the benefit of my wife during her life, and after her death, for
the sole benefit of my daughter." The plaintiff allowed the widow
of the testator to receive the rents of the premises until her death,
which happened some years subsequently to that of the testator.
This suit was instituted by the plaintiff to obtain the opinion of the
court as to the power of the above paper to effect a disposition by
the settlor of his property.
ROmILLY, Master of the Rolls, said, "I examined what would have
been the effect of this document, so far as it relates to the stock which
had been transferred into the name of (the plaintiff) Tierney, the
trustee. If this had not been sold out afterwards, by direction of
the testator, and the direction to pay the dividefids had been complied with by Tierney, the result would have been that the relation
of trustee and cestui que trust between Tierney and the person mentioned in the instrument, would have been completed, so far as that
stock was concerned, and the fact that the document had been a voluntary act on the part of the settlor would not have prevented this court
from acting upon it: Bx parte P!ye and .Dubost, 18 Yes: 140;
Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav. 315.
The 'Master of the Rolls then held that the document was good
as a declaration of trust, as far as the land was concerned, to take
effect upon the death of the settlor.
Purnell v. Hingston, 3 Sm. & Giff. 337 (1856). John Hingston
executed a voluntary deed, which purported to convey property to
his brother, as trustee, upon various trusts. By the connivance of
his brother he was allowed to retain possession of part of the property
conveyed. Hleld, on a bill filed after the settlor's death, by the beneficiaries under the settlement, that the latter were entitled to relief
against the trustee and the personal representative of the settlor, it
appearing that more than sufficient property to satisfy the claim
had come into the hands of the trustee.
The Vice-Chancellor held, p. 345, " that even if there were any
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imperfection in the operation of the deed, as vesting property in
the trustee, there was sufficient authority to show that the deed
was a valid declaration of trust to bind the property in the hands
of the settlor." And on p. 346, "even where the deed was invalid
as a transfer of the legal title, it might, M in the present case,
fasten a trust on the property which it purported to assign. It
was not a mere engagement to create a trust, but a complete declaration," citing -z parte iPye, 18 Ves. 140; Fortesmue v. Bartlett, 3 Myl. & Keene '3; and Blakley v. Brady, 2 Drury & Walsh
311; which cases were said to have established the rule that there
may be a valid declaration of trust by an instrument which purported ineffectually to convey a legal title.
G-7ert v. Overton, 2 Hemming & Miller 110, 116 (1864). In
this case the settlor had assigned all the interest which he held
in an agreement for a lease subject to rents and covenants, to
trustees on trust after the settlor's decease as to one-fifth thereof to
his son for life, with remainder to his other children. A short
time after the execution of the settlement the legal estate in the
above lease was demised to the settlor. The settlor's legal estate
was never assigned by him to the trustees.
The question was whether 6r not the settlement was a valid one,
it being argued against its validity that the settlement was voluntary, and that the settlor had never conveyed to the trustees the
legal estate.
The Vice-Chancellor, Sir W. PAGE WooD, held that the settlement
was valid, saying that it contained a declaration of trust, and that was
all that was wanting to make any settlement effectual. The settlor
had conveyed his equitable interest, and directed the trustees to hold
it upon the trust thereby declared. It was an exploded idea that in
a voluntary instrument such a declaration of trust was insufficient.
Such a declaration of trust was just as good as if the testator had
declared that he himself would stand possessed upon these terms.
The whole doctrine of the court declining to assist voluntary
settlements arose in the first instance out of two classes of cases;
one where the settlor retained possession, and was considered to
have reserved a locus pcnitentile,and the other where a settlor had
made an incomplete conveyance, and the volunteers came into court
to have it perfected. Where trusts had been actually executed,
and administration only was asked, the court always gave its assistance, just as if the settlor had declared himself a trustee. The
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trustees in this case could have had the settlement carried into
execution, and could have obtained a lease in a suit for specific
performance. The circumstance that the settlor afterwards got in
the legal estate, did not displace the trusts which had been once
effectually created. Where a settlor by a voluntary instrument
conveyed all his interest, it might well be held that if that interest
proved to be merely equitable the assignees became entitled to claim
a conveyance of the legal estate from the person in whom it might
be vested.
SEcoND *Poposrtr.--Where a voluntary conveyance or gift
has been perfected, it cannot he revoked; and the grantee or donee
will be aided in establishingM8 rights by a court of equity.

(layering v. Clavering, 2 Vernon 473 (1704). Sir James Clavering, in 1683, had made a voluntary settlement in trust for his
grandson. In 1690, he made another settlement of the same estate
to his eldest son for life, with remainder over, and by will gave his
.personal estate to the same grandson. It was proved that he had
always kept the first settlement in his own custody, and had never
published it, and that it was after his death found amongst waste
papers ; and that the second deed or settlement was often mentioned by him, and that he told the tenants that his son (the plaintiff), the grantee under the second deed, was to be their landlord after
his death. Reldg that the first settlement could not be revoked by the
second. The Lord Keeper declared that he was sufficiently satisfied that the manor of Lamedon was intended as a provision for
the plaintiff, and that it was but a reasonable provision, but that
the case was too hard to be relieved in equity. Though the first
settlement was always in the custody or power of Sir James Clavering, yet that did not give him a power to resume the estate;
and although voluntary conveyances, if defective, should not in
many cases be supplied in equity, yet where there had been a covenant to stand seised to the use of a relation, although it is a voluntary settlement, yet this court in the ancient times always executed
such uses. In the Lady fudon'a case, where the father, having
taken displeasure at his son, made an additional jointure on his
wife, but kept in his power, and being afterwards reconciled to his
son, cancelled the additional jointure and died,- his wife after his
decease found the cancelled deed, and recovered by virtue of it.
And see Barlow et ux. v. Heneage, Pre. Ch. 211.
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Boughton v. Bougglton, 1 Atkyns 625 (1736). The question was
whether a voluntary deed could be revoked by a subsequent will.
Chancellor HAURDVICKE said that the will was no more than voluntary, and as there was no case where a voluntary settlement had
been set aside by a subsequent will, it no longer remained a question.
.Kzye v. Moore, 1 Sim. & S u. 61-64 (1822). In this case a married man had executed a deed, liroviding, in case of his death, for
a woman, with whom he had lived in adultery, and his children by
her, and deposited it in the hands of his attorney, but afterwards
procured possession of it. Sir JOHN LeACH, V.-C., held, on
demurrer, that the woman and children could maintain a bill to
compel him to deliver up this deed.
Simonton's Estate, 4 Watts 180 (1835). An agreement to deliver a deed as an escrow to the person in whose favor it is made,
will not make the delivery conditional; but if delivered under it, it
is an absolute delivery, a consummation of the execution of the
deed.
1ycroft v. C~rdyt, 8 Beav. 288, 241 (1840). A cestui que trust
who was entitled for life to the income of a certain fund, instructed
her trustee, by an instrument entered into between them,. to pay
a certain portion of the interest, to which she was entitled, for the
maintenance of a certain child, in no way related to the eestui que
trust, until she should attain sixteen years, and covenanted to
indemnify the trustee in respect of such sums, and agreed to allow
him the same out of the dividends payable to her. The trustee
accepted these trusts and acted upon it for several years. The cestul
que trust subsequently filed this bill against the trustee for the
administration of the estate, and the question -was whether or not
the new trust; declared by the eestui que trust, could be set aside at
her desire. But the Master of the Rolls, Lord LAxGDAL-E, held that
this could not be done. She had executed an instrument which
contained an express direction to the trustee to pay a certain por
tion of the property to the child. So far as the 'etui que trust had
the power, she had transferred the trust to the object she desired to
be benefited, and from the moment that direction was signed, and
accepted by the trustee, it became his duty to pay the money
directed to the child. The trust was not revocable.
Cressmau's Alyeal, 6 Wright (Pa.) 147 (1862). A mother
entitled by the intestate laws to the whole of her deceased son's
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personal estate, signed articles of agreement with her other children by which the balance of the estate was to be invested, the
interest to be used for the benefit of an invalid son, and the principal, at his death, to go to the brothers and sisters of the intestate.
The money was invested and the interest paid as agreed on for
several years, when the mother claimed the balance of the estate,
repudiated her agreement as invalid, on the grounds that some of
her children were minors when they executed it with her, and that
itwas voluntary. ifeld, that the articles amounted to an executed
trust in favor of the- children, and that, though voluntary, it could
not be rescinded.
THIRD PnoPosrrIo.-T he mere fact that the instrument byf
which the conveyance or gift operates, or that the instrument which
is the evidence of the comyletion of the transfer, and of the legal
title of the transferree, is retained by, or has gotten back into the
hands of, the grantor or donor, does not render revocable the grant
or gift, otherwise irrevocable. Nor.f the propertigiven is a fund,
does the fact that the donor retainspossession and exercises control
divest an executed gift.
FTorrall v. Jacob, 3 Merivale 256 (1817). The grantee of a
power, Mary Wilkinson, duly executed a deed in accordance with
the power appointing the estate to Worrall for life, and after his
death to the use of his children as tenants in common. Three
days afterwards the deed was re-scaled and re-delivered by her in
presence of the same persons who were witnesses to the first sealing
and delivery, which was mentioned in the deed, whereby the estato
was appointed to the use of Worrall for life, and after his death to
the use of Ann Worrall, his ife, for her life, and after their several
deceases, to the children as before. The question was whether Mrs.
Worrall could claim under the second deed. Sir WILLIAM GRAxT,
Master of the Rolls, said that, as to her claim, the objection to it
was that, as Mrs. Wilkinson had reserved no power of revocation, she
could.not insert a limitation which had, pro tanto, the effect of revoking the appointment she had already made. The answer attempted
to be given to this objection was that as this was on the part of
Mrs. Wilkinson a mere voluntary deed which had not been out of
her own custody, she might cancel or revoke, and d fortiori,alter
it at her pleasure. But there was no authority for a proposition so
broadly stated. The case of Olavering v. C'lavering, 2 Vern. 473,
VOL. XXVI.-2
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was a direct' authority the other way. Sir JosEPI JEKYLL had
conceived 'it to be so clear that a voluntary deed, once perfected,
could not be revoked at pleasure, that he established the copy of the
first deed, though the original had been destroyed by the maker.
In Brown v. Cavendish, 1 Jones & Latouche 606, 637 (1844),
SUGDErN, Lord Chancellor, said that where under a voluntary settlement the fund had been actually vested in trustees, though there
bad been no consideration for the creation of the trust, and though
the fund had got back by accident into the possession of the person
who created the trust, yet the trust might be enforced for the benefit of volunteers, for the relation of trustee and. cestui que trust
had been created. In Bill v. Cureton, 2 Al. & K. 603, the distinction was taken and enforced in favor 'of the voluntary settlement.
Kiddill v. Yarnell, 5 Weekly Reporter 424 (1857). STUART, V.C. : The transfer of a sum of stock under a power of attorney, given
by the donor a day or two before her death to her sister, who had
lived with her from childhood, and to whom she was much attached,
was held good, although the stock was not transferred into the name
of the donee until after the donor's death.
_Evans v. Taning8, 6 Weekly Reporter 616 (1858). A member of a mercantile firm, with which firm his sisters-in-law had
a deposit account, transferred 27001. to that account, and procured from his firm a promissory note to that amount, which
sum he verbally ,declared was to be the private property of his wife.
lHe enclosed a note in an envelope, upon which he endorsed a memorandum to the following effect: "This note of hand stands to the
credit of Martha and Christiana Forth, in the banks of Seager,
Evans & Co., and is to be the property of Mrs. Evans." Afterwards, without having parted with the possession of the note, he
transferred the 27001., in the books of the firm, into an account
of his own, at the same time writing across the memorandum, above
referred to, another memorandum, as follows: "The within amount
of 27001. is transferred to William Evans's trustee account, but it
is to be considered the private property of Mrs. Evans." He dealt
with the 27001. as his own property, paying his wife no interest
thereon, and ultimately reducing the capital sum to an amount less
than 27001. By his will he bequeathed to his wife an annuity
of 10001. during her widowhood, but did not refer to or mention
the above sum of 27001., and gave his residuary estate to his niece.
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Held, that a valid trust had been created for the separate use of the
wife, and upon a bill filed by her after his death she was declared
entitled to the 2700., out of his estate, with interest from the day of
hi, decease. STUART, V.-C., said that there was a most essential difference between the case of a man who declares that he will hold property in trust for another, and that of one who only affects to give;
but did nothing to complete his gift. He was surprised to find it
laid down that if there .was a declaration of trust, with notice to the
trustee, the question whether the latter acted upon such notice or
not made a difference as to the validity of the declaration of trust.
It was always his* understanding that wherever property was once
impressed with a trust, the right of the cestui que trust was wholly
independent of the conduct of his trustee; that the recognition
of the trusi by the latter, on the one hand, or his refusal to execute
it, on the other, could not affect the interest of the person beneficially entitled. If the trusts were once impressed, it could not
affect the right of the cestui que trust that the trustee had applied
the trust property to his own use or otherwise committed a breach

of trust.

A. SYDNEY

BRIDDLE.

(To be continued.)
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Supreme Court of New Jersey/.
JOHN HIRES v. WILLIA'M HURFF.
The property in a chattel passes according to the intention of the parties. That
is a question of fact for the jury, unless it is plain by admitted facts, that the law
will justify a finding but one way.
Where there is a contract for the sale of a smaller quantity of goods from a
greater mass of like quality (corn), which remains in the possession of the seller,
without selection or appropriation, the contract is executory, and the property does

not pass, unless there be a clearly expressed intention to make the sale complete
without further action by the parties.

ON error to Gloucester Circuit Court. This was an action of
trover, brought by the sheriff of Salem county, John Hires. to recover the value of two hundred bushels of corn, under the following
circumstances: In November 1873, George W. Heritage was the
owner of about five hundred bushels of corn, in bulk, and sold two
hundred bushels of the same to William Hurff, who paid cash. By
the verbal terms of the sale, the two hundred bushels of corn were
to be retained by Heritage until they were in a condition to keep

